Introduction
The economic forces which determine equilibrium market volatility and risk premia are probably the most debated topics in the analysis of financial markets. Part of the debate is the empirical evidence revealing market "anomalies" which have challenged students of the subject.
Consumption-based asset pricing theory, closely aligned with dynamic general equilibrium theory, has had a profound impact on our view of financial markets and of asset price determination process. Early work of Leroy (1973) , Lucas (1978) , Breeden (1979) , Grossman and Shiller (1981) , Mehra and Prescott (1985) , Hansen and Singleton (1983) and others show how intertemporal optimization of investor incorporates a subtle relationship between consumption growth and asset returns. However, when examined empirically, this same simple relationship fails to provide a correct quantitative measure of the risk premia of different asset categories. The Equity Premium Puzzle (see, Mehra and Prescott (1985) ) is a special case of the general fact that assets prices are more volatile than can be explained by "fundamental" shocks and the observed premia on risky assets are much larger than predicted by the theory.
Risk premia which are difficult to account for are not confined to the consumption based asset pricing theory; they arise while employing diverse models of asset pricing. Three examples will illustrate. The Expectations Hypothesis is rejected by most studies of the term structure (e.g. Backus, Gregory and Zin (1989) , Campbell and Shiller (1991) ) implying excessive risk premium on longer maturity debt. Foreign exchange markets exhibit a "Forward Discount Bias" (see Froot and Frankel (1989) and Engel (1996) ) which implies an unaccounted for risk premium for holding foreign exchange. The market pricing of derivative securities generate excess implied volatility of the underlying securities which results in unaccounted for risk premia associated with holding of derivative assets. Many writers treat these type of phenomena as unusual anomalies and give them distinct labels, presuming standard models of capital asset pricing theory could then account for all normal premia. Our perspective is different.
This paper contributes to a unified theory of asset price volatility and the determinants of risk premia. We propose that risk premia are primarily determined by the structure of agents' expectations called "the market state of belief." Heterogeneity of belief is then the root cause of price volatility and the main factor explaining risk premia. Our theory incorporates agents who may be "bulls" or "bears." An agent is a bull at date t if he expects the date t+1 rate of return on his investment to be higher than normal, where "normal" returns are defined by the empirical distribution of past returns. A date t bear expects returns at t+1 to be lower than normal.
Agents in our economy do not hold Rational Expectations (in short RE) since the environment is dynamically changing hence non stationary, and the true probability of events is unknown. In such an economy agents construct their own subjective models of the market. Some may consider our agents irrational. We think it is not reasonable to require agents to know what they cannot know. Hence, in a dynamically complex economy there is a wide gulf between the All Knowing Rational Expectations agent and irrational behavior which can easily be improved upon.
Our agents hold diverse but rational beliefs in accord with the theory of Rational Belief Equilibrium (in short, RBE) due to Kurz [1994] and explored in papers included in Kurz [1996] , [1997] . We believe this rationality principle strikes a proper balance between RE and irrational behavior and to assist readers unfamiliar with this theory, we briefly explain it.
The Rational Belief Principle
"Rational Belief" (in short, RB) is not a theory which demonstrates that rational agents should adopt any particular belief. Indeed, since the RB theory explains the observed belief heterogeneity, it would be a contradiction to propose that a particular belief is the "correct" belief a rational agents must adopt. The RB theory starts by observing that the true stochastic law of motion of the economy is non-stationary with structural breaks and complex dynamics, where the probability law of the process is not known by anyone. Agents have a long history of past data generated by the process which they use to compute relative frequencies of finite dimensional events and correlation among observed variables. With this knowledge they compute the empirical distribution and use it to construct an empirical probability measure over sequences. Since these computations are based on the law of large numbers, the estimated probability model is stationary.
Within the RB theory it is called the "empirical measure" or the "stationary measure."
In contrast with a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (in short, REE) where the true law of motion is common knowledge, agents in an RBE form subjective and diverse beliefs based only on market data. Hence, any principle on the basis of which agents can be judged as rational must be based on the data rather than on the true but unknown law of motion. Since a "belief" is a model of the economy together with a probability over sequences of variables, such a model can be used to generate artificial data. With simulated data an agent can compute the empirical distribution of observed variables and the empirical probability measure the model implies. Based on these facts, the RB theory proposes a simple Principle of Rationality. It says that if the agent's model generates an empirical distribution which is not the same as the one known for the economy, then the agent's model (i.e. "belief") is declared irrational. The converse also holds: for a belief to be rational its simulated data must reproduce the known empirical distribution of the observed variables. The RB rationality principle declares a belief to be rational if it is a model which cannot be disproved with the available empirical evidence. Since diverse theories are compatible with the evidence, this rationality principle permits diversity of beliefs among equally informed rational agents. Agents who hold rational beliefs may make "incorrect" forecasts at date t but must be correct, on average.
Date t forecasts may deviate from the forecasts implied by the empirical probability. However, the RB rationality principle requires the time average of forecasts to agree with the forecast implied by the empirical frequencies. It thus follows as a theorem that agents who hold rational beliefs must have forecast functions which vary over time. The tool we use to describe the beliefs of agents in an economy is the "market state of belief." It is a state variable which uniquely defines the vector of conditional probability functions held by agents in the economy at each date t.
The RB rationality principle is compatible with several known theories. An REE is a special case of an RBE and so are the REE with sunspots. Most models of Bayesian learning satisfy the RB rationality principle. Also, several models of Behavioral Economics satisfy this principle for some parameter values.
Earlier papers using the RBE rationality principle have also argued that agents' beliefs are central to explaining the volatility of financial markets (e.g. Kurz (1996) , (1997a), Kurz and Schneider (1996) , Kurz and Beltratti (1997) , Kurz and Motolese (2001) and Nielsen (1996) ).
These papers aimed to explain a list of financial "anomalies." (for a unified treatment see Kurz and Motolese (2001)). The RBE theory was used by Kurz (1997b) and Nielsen (2003) to explain the volatility of foreign exchange rates. All these papers used OLG models in which exogenous shocks are discrete random variables and agents have a finite set of states of belief . Wu and Guo (2003) (2004) study speculation and trading volume in the steady state of an infinite horizon model. The novel contribution of this paper consists of three parts: (i) ours is a full infinite horizon model, (ii) all random variables are continuous and we use standard AR processes to describe beliefs and exogenous shocks, and (iii) we explicitly model agents' beliefs about the market state of belief, which amounts to beliefs about the beliefs of others. We argue that this mechanism is central to understanding the volatility and risk premia in financial markets.
The Main Findings
In this paper we show that there are two simple characteristics of diverse market beliefs which fully account for the characteristics of market volatility and premia observed in real markets: (A) high intensity of fat tails in the belief densities of agents; (B) asymmetry in the proportion of bull and bear states in the market over time.
High intensity means the subjective densities agents use to make forecasts have fat tails, the sizes of which depend upon their states of belief. Asymmetry in the time frequency of belief states is a subtle characteristic which says that on average, agents are in bear states at more than 50% of the dates.
Equivalently, on average, at more than half of the time agents do not expect to make above normal return on their investments. Therefore, it follows from the RB principle that when agents are in bull states and expect above normal returns, their expected excess returns tend to be very high. This asymmetry reflects the fact that major rises in stock prices occur over a relatively small fraction of time following market declines. Hence, when agents are in states where they believe a bull market is ahead, they also expect to make large excess return over relatively shorter periods.
The same model we use to study the statistics of market volatility is used to study other aspects of market dynamics. We show that our model implies market returns must exhibit stochastic volatility which is generated by the dynamics of the market state of belief. In addition, stock prices and returns exhibit a structure of forecastability which is observed in the real data.
We formulate a general equilibrium, consumption based, asset pricing model and study its computational solutions. However, the paper is not intended as calibration work. Although our numerical results correspond well to the observed market data, the numerical results are used merely to draw theoretical conclusions by highlighting the qualitative implications of our theory.
As to organization, in Section 1 we formulate a model with two infinitely lived dynasties of agents and two assets. In section 2 we study the volatility of the corresponding REE. In section 3
we define the RBE, explain the rationality of belief conditions and the restrictions they impose on beliefs. In Section 4 we study moments implied by the RBE. In Section 5 we study the stochastic volatility implied by the RBE and in Section 6 we take up the predictability of returns.
The Economic Environment
The model economy has two types of agents and a large number of identical agents within each type. Each agent is a member of one of two types of infinitely lived dynasties identified by their endowment, their utility which is defined over consumption and by their belief. A member of a dynasty lives a fixed short life and during his life makes decisions based on his own state of belief without knowing the states of belief of his predecessors. There are two traded assets: a stock and a riskless, one period, bond. The economy has an aggregate output process which Y t , t 1, 2, . . . is divided between dividends paid to owners of the common stock and non -D t , t 1, 2, . . . dividend endowment which is paid to the agents. The dividend process is described by
where { , t = 1, 2, ...} is a stochastic process under a true probability which is non-stationary with x t structural breaks and time dependent distribution. We assume the growth process is a stable 5 A Stable Process is defined in Kurz (1994) . It is a stochastic process which has an empirical distribution of the observable variables defined by the limits of relative frequencies of finite dimensional events. These limits are used to define the empirical distribution which, in turn, induces a probability measure over infinite sequences of observables which is central to the theory of Rational Beliefs. 6 The key assumption is then that agents do not know the true probability but have ample past data from which they deduce that (2) is implied by the empirical distribution. Hence the data reveals a memory of length 1 and residuals which are i.i.d. normal. This assumption means that even if (2) is the true data generating process, agents do not know this fact. An agent who holds a Rational Belief may believe the true process is non-stationary and different from (2), but to be rational his model is required to generates the same statistics (i.e. empirical distribution) as generated by (2). 6 process 5 hence it has an empirical distribution which the agents learn and know. This empirical distribution is represented by the growth rate being a stationary Markov process defined by 6 (2) with i.i.d.
The infinitely lived agents are enumerated j = 1, 2 and we use the following notation:
-consumption of j at t; C j t -amount of stock purchased by j at t; © j t -amount of one period bond purchased at discount by agent j at t; B j t -stock price at date t; q s t -the discount price of a one period bond at t; q b t -non capital income of agent j at date t; j t H t -information at t, recording the history of all observables up to t. Given probability belief , agent j selects portfolio and consumption plans to solve the problem Q j t (3a) Max
subject to:
We assume additively separable, power utility over consumption, a model that failed to generate premia in other studies (see, Campbell and Cochrane (2000) ). We focus on diverse beliefs hence assume the two utility functions are the same. Introduce the normalization for j = 1, 2 We define the REE as a solution when agents believe (2) is the truth. We simulated this REE and report in Table 1the mean and standard deviations of (i) the price\dividend ratio , (ii) the q s 8 Other approaches to the equity premium puzzle were reported by Brennan and Xia [1998] , Epstein and Zin [1990] , Cecchetti, Lam and Mark [1990] , [1993] , Heaton and Lucas [1996] , Mankiw [1986] , Reitz [1988] , Weil [1989] and others. For more details see Kocherlakota [1996] . Some degree of excess volatility can also be explained with explicit learning mechanism which does not die out (see for example Timmermann (1996) ).
8 risky return R on the stock, (iii) the one year riskless interest rate the premium of equity return r , e p over the return on one year bond, the Sharp Ratio and the correlation between x and stock returns.
Moments of market data vary with sources reporting and methods of estimation. The estimates in Table 1 are based on Shiller (http://www.econ.yale.edu/shiller) and others. They represent our best approximation of the order of magnitude of the data reported in most studies. The results in Table 1 are familiar. Note that apart from the low equity premium, the volatility of the REE in Table 1 is low: all model volatility measures are lower than market data by an order of magnitude. The debate about these results under the heading of the "Equity Premium
Puzzle" is important since the asset pricing theory is derived in a general equilibrium framework.
Hence the puzzle requires us to reevaluate the economic foundations of the REE paradigm.
Some writers argued in favor of introducing habit formation in utility to generate time variability of risk aversion (e.g. see Abel (1990 Abel ( ), (1999 , and Constantinides (1990) 8 ). Campbell and Cochrane (1999), (2000) assume that at habit the marginal utility of consumption and degree of risk aversion rise without bound. Hence, when consumption declines to habit risk aversion increases, stock prices decline and risk premium rises. Although the model generates moments which are closer to those observed in the market, the theory is unsatisfactory. First, with X t = habit, utility is . But why should the marginal utility and risk aversion explode when C t 1 1
approaches the mean of past consumption? Campbell and Cochrane (1999, page 244) show that for the model to generate the desired moments, the degree of risk aversion is 80 at steady state and exceeds 300 frequently along any time path. If instead we use Abel's (1990) , (1999) Table 1 ) shows date t stock returns have low correlation with date t consumption growth.
Above all, the habit formation model proposes a theory which claims that asset premia are caused by an unreasonably high degree of risk aversion. Our alternative view proposes that risk premia are determined primarily by the structure of market expectations.
Constructing a Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE)

States of Belief and RBE
In a typical RBE agents believe the environment is not stationary and past data do not provide a perfect guide to the future. As a result, a given stochastic process of exogenous shocks is compatible with diverse beliefs about the future and hence with diverse RBE. Our methodology of studying RBE is to construct a large family of such equilibria and to examine the volatility characteristics of its members. The family is characterized by an AR stochastic law of motion of the state and by a structure of agents' beliefs. We think the structure of beliefs is as primitive an explanatory variable of economic phenomena as utility, technology or financial constraints. Hence we aim to understand the characteristics of those belief structures which generates volatility and premia in the order of magnitudes observed in the data.
To define RB, consider the economy as a data generating mechanism so that from past data agents know the empirical distribution of observables. A Rational Belief is a probability measure on sequences of future states together with a model of the economy. It has a property that if simulated, it generates the same empirical distribution as the empirical distribution of the observables in the real economy. Conditional forecasts induced by an RB may be wrong at any date but their time average are correct in the sense that they equal the forecasts that would be made with the probability measure implied by the empirical distribution. We call this probability The Stationary, or Empirical, 9 The empirical distribution of the observable variables or their moments induce a probability measure over infinite sequences of observables which is central to the theory of Rational Beliefs. A general definition and construction of this probability measure is explained in Kurz (1994 or Kurz-Motolese (2001) where it is shown that this probability must be stationary. Statements in the text about "the stationary measure" or "the empirical distribution" is always a reference to this probability. Its centrality arises from the fact that it is derived from public information and hence the stationary measure is known to all agents and agreed upon by all to reflect the empirical distribution of observable equilibrium variables. In terms of equilibrium concepts, an RBE has the property that within the set of market beliefs an RBE is a fixed point in empirical distributions. 10 For a detailed account of the theory of Rational Beliefs see Kurz (1997a) and for additional details regarding the constructive approach to RBE, see Kurz and Motolese (2001) In this paper we construct an RBE, use perturbation methods to compute it and study its volatility via simulations. Since we wish to demonstrate our economy exhibits fluctuations which are qualitatively similar to those observed in the market, our construction proceeds in three steps 10 .
(i) Specify a family of empirical distributions of state variables which is then assumed known to agents who learn it from the data. Most parameter values are based on their empirical estimates, known from other studies. Some values are based on our best judgement.
(ii) Specify the beliefs of agents and formulate conditions which then rationalize them relative to the empirical distribution specified in (i). These are the rationality conditions of the RBE.
(iii) Use the equilibrium conditions developed earlier to define equilibrium prices and endogenous variables, and then study the dynamics of an equilibrium by simulating the model economy.
The Empirical Distribution of the State
In a Markov economy a probability is represented by transition functions over states. In our constructed RBE the state vector is where is the growth rate of dividends and
is the market state of belief. In a large economy it would be a distribution but here we ( z 1 t , z 2 t ) have only two dynasties. For an empirical distribution we specify stationary transition functions for the state variables. The true process of the shocks { , t = 1, 2,...} is a stable and non-stationary x t process, incorporating structural changes, with a probability law which is not known to the agents.
However, for equilibrium analysis the true process does not matter: all that matters is the empirical distribution of the process and what agents believe about the true process. We assume the joint empirical distribution of the exogenous shocks and the states of belief is an AR process of the form (6a) x t 1 (1 economies where agents differ only in their beliefs hence we assume . The evidence
shows that positive productivity shocks lead agents to revise upward their economic growth forecasts implying . Our best guess of this parameter leads us to set but we discuss it
again later. Finally, we denote by m the probability measure on infinite sequences implied by (6) together with the invariant distribution as the initial distribution.
To write (6) in a more compact notation let , and
denote by A the 3×3 matrix of parameters in (6). We then write (6a) - (6c) as (7) w t 1 Aw t
where is the covariance matrix in (6). Denote by V the 3×3 unconditional covariance of w defined by . We later need the value of V and compute it as solution of the equation
Personal States of Belief and the Anonymity Principle
In a non-stationary environment, an agent's conditional probability is time dependent and over time he deviates from the forecasts implied by the empirical distribution. His conditional probability may be above the empirical probability (he is "optimistic") or below it (he is "pessimistic"). But why specify the formal belief formation model our agent uses to deviate from the stationary empirical forecasts? A theory that uses the distribution of heterogenous beliefs to explain observed phenomena faces the problem of determining a level of detail at which agents explain why they adopt the beliefs they hold. If we require a complete specification of such modeling, a theory is doomed to get bogged down in details about inference from small samples and information processing. Such approach is useful, but from the perspective of equilibrium theory it is not needed. All we need is a method to describe how an agent's model affects his conditional probability and to ensure the rationality of belief conditions are satisfied. Since the rationality principle requires the time average of the conditional probabilities to equal the empirical frequency, his conditional probability beliefs fluctuate around the empirical measure. Hence we seek a tractable 11 Thus let X be a space of observables and let ( , ( ) be the space of infinite sequences of (X)¡ (X)¡ observables where ( ) is the Borel ¢ -field of . To describe a non-stationary process we use variables (X)¡ (X)¡ with a marginal probability space ( , ( , µ ). We then define the desired non-stationary y
, the conditional probability of Q j with respect to the sequence y j .
The effective probability space ( , 11 It is formally similar to models where Y is a set of possible regimes, and are "regime variables." The subjective variables are y t y j t Y j parameters the agent uses to describe his belief. Their main benefit is statistical since the stochastic structure specifies the empirical regularity of and this regularity is used to state the rationality of y j t belief conditions. Since rational agents do not deviate systematically from empirical forecasts, in order to establish rationality of belief we need a statistical measure of an agent's deviations from these forecasts.
are simple mathematical devices used to measure such regularity. y Although the market state of beliefs at t is nothing but a distribution of the , anonymity y j t finite number of firms who are required to disregard their impact on prices. By looking at past data a competitive firm in a market with a finite number of firms can demonstrate that it had an effect on prices in violation of this assumption. 
(9) is compatible with the equation in (6) except that (6) specifies a joint distribution of all state z j t variables while (9) specifies only a marginal distribution of j as perceived by agent j (for more details, see Appendix B). Since { , t = 1, 2, ...} exhibit serial correlation, we exclude from all y j t y j t information already in the market at t in order to isolate the pure subjective component of belief.
To that end introduce a variable as follows. Denote by agent j's u is just a sequence of parameters. However, for these y j t rationality conditions we need to study the empirical distribution of sequences { , t = 1, 2,...)} which t ¡ 1 (u j t ) depend upon the . In order to do that we need to know the empirical regularity of the and this is where the u j t y j t specification (9), about the statistical regularity of these assessment variables, come into play.
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Perception Models and the Rationality of Belief Conditions
A perception model is a set of transition functions of the state variables, reflecting the agent's belief about date t+1 transition probability. We first explain the general form of a perception model, using (7) (7), j uses the empirical probability y
m as his belief. With this formulation we can state the rationality of belief conditions. These require the empirical distributions of (7) and (11a) 
3.4a Formulating The Perception Models
In modeling we consider several factors. Agents may be over confident by being t 1 (u j t ) optimistic or pessimistic relative to the empirical forecasts. Evidence from the psychological literature (e.g. Svenson (1981) , Camerer and Lovallo (1999) and references there) shows agents exhibit such behavior. Since in an RBE agents do not know the true probability, in our context such behavior is not irrational if it respects the rationality principle. But why do agents make either bullish or bearish forecasts in our model? Condition (6) specifies only the empirical distribution of a non-stationary state process. Moreover, for stating the Euler equations and equilibrium map the true process is not relevant; all that matters is what agents believe the process is. Technological and institutional changes are central features of our economy and past statistics do not provide the best forecasts for the future. Deviations from the empirical forecast reflect judgements, based on limited recent data, about "structural breaks" or, more generally, about market "timing" and about changes in market conditions an agent believes are occurring. The motive for making such judgments arises from the substantial financial gains to agents who assess correctly the conditions which determine future dividends and prices. However, the formal subjective belief formation modeling is kept in the background. A second factor to be considered in modeling is related to the rationality t 1 (u j t ) conditions which require that is serially uncorrelated. Finally, the effect of the state of (ii) intensity of forecast deviation generated by any given value of . u j t Rationality of belief implies a tradeoff between these two effects and this substitution is important and will be explored later when we discuss the results.
To address all these issues we specify the random sequence to take the form 2 ) (equality due to symmetry) are the object of our study and their effect on volatility is examined later. We next construct the random variables . 
where and (in (9)) are independent and where . The functions
are defined by a logistic function with two parameters a and b (
, and define G E ( u j ) ,
a > 0 , b > 0 and .
The parameter a measures asymmetry and the parameter b measures intensity of fat tails in beliefs. Technical details of this construction are discussed in Appendix A.
To explain (12)- (14) 14 It will become clear that shifts in probability of positive and negative outcomes means changes of probability belief in gains or losses of investments. Hence, it will reflect unequal valuation of gains and losses and this may remind the reader ideas developed in the psychological literature under the heading of Prospect Theory (see Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ). Prospect Theory suggests that apart from concavity, it is inherent in the utility of agents to treat a small loss as more significant than an equal gain. Our agents do indeed place heavier weight on losses when they are pessimistic about investment returns and they place a heavier weight on gains when they are optimistic about returns. However, this difference in weight arises because they do not believe that the gains and losses are equally likely. Moreover, under our treatment they may place increased weight either on losses or on gains, depending upon their state of belief. 
FIGURE 1 PLACE HERE
The parameter a measures asymmetry. It determines the frequency at which agents are bulls. To see why note that if a = 0, (13) is symmetric around 0 ( the unconditional mean of u j ) and the probability of u j > 0 is 50%. When a > 0 the probability of u j > a is less than 50% and if , the frequency at which j is pessimistic, exceeds 50%. In a large market this y >0 would mean that , on average, a majority of traders is pessimistic about t+1 returns. However, "optimism" does not mean a belief in high returns but rather, it is a high probability belief in above normal returns. Also, it is irrational to always be a bull or always be a bear. Hence, if an agent is a bear more than 50% of the time, the intensity of his optimism (when optimist) must be greater than the intensity of pessimism (when pessimist). "Intensity" means deviations from the empirical probabilities. This discussion shows that when , bears are in the majority and Moreover, what is the economic interpretation of the behavior implied by these parameter values?
The Explicit Form of the Perception Models
We can now combine the development up to now to formulate the final form of the perception models of the agents: 
3.4c The Rationality of Belief Conditions
As noted before, the rationality principle requires that (16) has the same joint empirical distribution as . In Appendix B we show two facts: (a) that these conditions fully specify the covariance matrix ¤ of the innovations , and (b) that is serially uncorrelated. 
¥ as Implied Restriction of the Rationality Conditions
We study here only the symmetric case and for the empirical distribution we assume , . For the beliefs we use the symmetric notation 15 The feasible set is open as it requires the covariance matrix to be positive definite hence no maximal values can be taken. The objective is then is to set the parameters so that they are close to the boundary but do not destabilize the computational procedure, generating error in the Euler Equations. For example, is 
3.4d Model Parameters and a Note on Computed Equilibria
Our goal is to explore the effect of belief parameters on market volatility and ( We compute equilibria in this paper using perturbation methods and utilizing a program developed by Hehui Jin (see Jin and Judd (2002) and Jin (2003) ). A solution is declared to be an equilibrium if the following holds: (i) a model is approximated by at least second order derivatives;
(ii) errors in market clearing conditions and Euler equations are less than . In Appendix C we 10 ¡ 3 provide more details on our computational model.
Characteristics of Volatility I: Moments
We now study the moments of the time series generated by our model. Intensity of fat tails and asymmetry in beliefs are crucial components of our theory. They enable the model to generate time series that match the U.S. record. But, what is the role of intensity and asymmetry in the propagation of volatility and which of the two types of economies discussed earlier are compatible with the empirical record? The answers to these questions show how the model matches the data.
However, they also explain on a theoretical level the forces which generate volatility and risk premia without reference to the particular values of the moments recorded in the U.S.
The Role of Intensity
We thus start with an experiment disabling the asymmetry parameter by setting a = 0 while varying the intensity parameter b. Without a detailed numerical demonstration we add the fact that the pattern observed in Table 3 remains the same for all feasible belief parameter of the model. Hence, the reasoning offered Table 3 shows the riskless rate declines towards 1% simply because the RBE becomes more volatile. This affects both the volatility of individual consumption growth rates as well as their correlation with the growth rate of aggregate consumption. In an REE this correlation is close to 1 but not in an RBE where variability of individual consumption growth depends upon the agents' beliefs. The low observed riskless rate has been a central problem in the equity premium puzzle debate (see Weil (1989) ) and the effect of the parameter b goes to the heart of this issue.
Our theory offers the intuitive explanation that non normal belief densities with fat tails and high intensity propagate high market volatility hence risk, making financial safety costly. increase and the risky rate should rise for symmetric reasons. For the riskless rate to decline but for the risky rate to remain the same in response to market volatility, there must be some asymmetry in the belief structure to induce a rise in the price to dividend ratio. The instrument for asymmetry is the parameter a which provides a measure of the time frequency of bear states. This frequency is , and since a > 0 we conclude that > 50% ( ¤ is the cumulative standard normal).
But when a > 0 the tail on the bull side must compensate for the higher frequency on the bear side hence the bull distribution must be more skewed than the bear distribution. As discussed earlier, there are two asymmetries within our model which define two types of economies that we consider.
In Economy 1 bear states are more frequent while in Economy 2 bull states are more frequent.
Which Asymmetry?
In Table 4 we test the two asymmetries with the following experiment. We fix b = 4.85 , a = 0.40 and pick three random pairs of values for . We then simulate the equilibria Being pessimistic about future returns is the same as considering present consumption as less expensive. Since = 2, for a pessimistic agent a 1% decreased relative cost of today's consumption leads only to a 0.5% increase in today's consumption. Equivalently, in an economy 16 Shilling(1992) shows that during the 552 months from January 1946 through December of 1991 the mean real annual total return on the Dow Jones Industrials was 6.7%. However, if an investor missed the 50 strongest months the real mean annual return over the other 502 months was -0.8%. Hence the financial motivation to time the market is very strong, as is the case with the agents in our model 25 where agents are, on average, more frequently bearish about the time average of is higher. x t 1 q s This implies that in an economy where agents are, on average, bearish more than 50% of the time the average price to dividend ratio is higher and the average rate of return is lower than in an economy where agents are, on average, bullish more than 50% of the dates. This is exactly what happens in Table 4 .
We do not have direct evidence in support of our conclusion that the frequency of bear states is, on average, higher than 50%. However, this conclusion is supported by the empirical fact that, on average, most above normal stock returns are made over relatively small proportion of time in which asset prices rally strongly (see Shilling(1992) ). An agent who invests for the long run experiences large above normal returns only a small proportion of time. Hence, on average, the proportion of time that one may expect to make above normal return is much less than 50%
16 .
Additional indirect support comes from the psychological literature which suggests agents place heavier weight on losses than on gains. In our treatment this is indeed the case at majority of dates due to the fact that on those dates agents believe abnormally lower return are more likely than higher. It follows from the RB principle that the higher frequency of bear states implies that when in bull states, an agent's intensity of optimism is higher than the intensity of pessimism. This means the average size of the positive tail in the belief densities is bigger than the average size of the negative tail. When in optimistic states our agents expect to make abnormal returns and with positive correlation in beliefs among such agents, these beliefs can rationalize market behavior that may look like a local bubble. Let us explain this fact.
The asymmetry results (i.e. a > 0 ) implies optimistic agents tend to be intense. We have noted that beliefs are highly correlated across agents hence we should expect to observe periods of high optimism across a majority of agents. When the level of optimism is very high, agents expect to make such high returns on their investments that they want to borrow and finance present and future consumption. This they cannot all do since bonds are in zero net supply. At such dates the only way markets can clear is by exhibiting sharp rises in stock prices together with high borrowing rates. Hence, our theory predicts that we should expect to observe rapidly rising stock prices induced by bursts of correlated optimism together with high realized growth rates of dividends. We would also expect to see crashes induced by correlated pessimistic agents together with low realized growth rates of dividends.
Matching the Moments
We now combine the effects of intensity and asymmetry to exhibit a region of parameters where the simulated moments are close to the empirical record. Table 5 provides a summary. It is clear from Table 5 that for values of b around 4.75 -5.00 and a around 0.25 -0.40 all moments are close to the moments observed in the market. Most significant is the fact that around this region of the parameter space all model statistics match simultaneously the moments and premium in the empirical record. We show later that the model with these parameter values exhibit qualitative dynamic properties such as forecastability of returns and stochastic volatility which are similar to those observed in the empirical record.
The fact that our model matches simultaneously the moments and the diverse phenomena associated with market volatility provides strong support for our theory. However, a property of simultaneous explanation of diverse phenomena by a single model rather than a specialized model for each phenomenon, is a crucial property any good theory of market volatility must have.
The results in Table 5 are due primarily to the two factors discussed: intensity of fat tails and asymmetry. We have already commented on evidence regarding asymmetry. We add the fact that it is well documented that the distribution of asset returns exhibit fat tails (e.g. see Fama (1965) and Shiller (1981) ). It is natural to ask where these tails come from. Our theory proposes that these fat tails in returns come from fat tails in the probability models of agents' beliefs.
We do not propose that the exact parameter values of a or b have particular significance.
Indeed, since the parameters also measure intensity of optimism, there is some Table   x y > 0, z y > 0 5 is the results. However, the stronger component of our conclusions is qualitative. We maintain that our theoretical conclusion are general and consist of three parts:
1. Asset pricing is a non stationary process reflecting technological and institutional change in our modern economy. As a result, the true underlying process is not known, giving rise to a wide diversity of beliefs about profitability of investments. This diversity is the main mechanism for propagating market volatility.
The first factor of volatility is the high intensity of fat tails of the agents' conditional
densities: it is the crucial force which generates volatility and low riskless rate.
The second component of market volatility is the asymmetry in the belief densities giving rise to markets in which the frequency of bear states is higher than 50%.
We also add that we arrived at our conclusions without specifying the formal subjective belief formation models of the agents. All we specified is how subjective states of belief affect the deviation of the agents' forecasts from the stationary empirical forecasts. Indeed, from the point of view of a general equilibrium, this is all that matters. Hence, the role of the Principle of Rationality consists of two parts. First, it provides the restrictions on the covariance matrix These factors turned out to be important for the way in which our model works. The empirical evidence supports this asymmetry as a real phenomenon.
Why Does the RBE Resolve the Equity Premium Puzzle?
Risk premia are compensations for subjective risk perception by risk averse agents. Since normal degrees of risk aversion are less than 10, to explain the observed risk premia we need to explain why volatility of an asset justifies the risk premia the market awards it. In most single agent models, aggregate consumption is exogenous hence volatility is exogenously fixed. In such models the market portfolio is identified with a security whose payoff is aggregate consumption. The Equity Premium Puzzle is the observation that the small volatility of aggregate consumption growth rates cannot justify a large equity premium of this security over riskless debt. Our theory of risk premia, which is based on the diversity of beliefs, takes a very different approach.
Heterogenous beliefs cause diverse individual consumption growth rates even if aggregate consumption is exogenous, which is the case in our model. Hence, individual consumption growth rates need not equal the aggregate rate. Since the agents' states of belief are as essential to them as the stochastic aggregate growth rate, they do not seek to own a portfolio whose payoff is aggregate consumption. Moreover, they disagree on the riskiness of this hypothetical asset. As a result, we do not focus on the relation between asset returns and aggregate consumption growth but instead, on the relation between asset returns and the volatility of individual consumption growth rates. We can thus sum up the factors contributing to the formation of risk premia in Table 5 .
(i) Low riskless rate and market volatility. In discussing Table 3 we noted that low riskless rate is a direct consequence of the high volatility of the RBE which creates added perceived risk. This added riskiness is called "Endogenous Uncertainty."
(ii) Higher volatility of individual consumption growth rates and correlation with x which is less than 1. It is clear that to satisfy individual Euler equations the standard problem of the Equity Premium Puzzle cannot arise. The key question is how volatile do individual consumption growth rates need to be in order to generate an equity premium of 6% and a riskless rate of 1%? The answer is: not very much. For the case a = 0.40 and b = 4.85 in Table 5 we find that although , the standard deviation of individual consumption growth rates is only 0.038
and the correlation between individual consumption growth rate and x is only 0.83 (compared to 1.00 in a representative household model). Both figures are compatible with survey data showing individual consumption growth are more volatile than the aggregate. Finally, we note that such volatility of consumption growth cannot occur in a single agent model since in that economy consumption growth rate is determined exogenously. More generally, in our view single agent models are ill suited for the study of phenomena associated with market volatility.
Characteristics of Volatility II: Predictability of Returns and Stochastic Volatility
We turn now to two other dimensions of asset price dynamics and market volatility with a view to compare predictions of our theory with the empirical record. More specifically, we study the predictability of stock returns and stochastic volatility, or GARCH, properties of stock prices and returns. All results reported below were computed for a sample of 20,000 equilibrium data points generated by Monte Carlo simulation of our model with a = 0.40 and b = 4.85 in Table 5 .
Predictability of stock returns
The problem of predictability of risky returns generated an extensive literature in empirical finance (e.g. French (1988a,1998b) , Poterba and Summers (1988) , Campbell and Shiller (1988) , Timmermann and Paye (2003) ). This debate is contrasted with the simple theoretical observation that under risk aversion asset prices and returns are not martingales, hence they contain a predictable component. It appears the disagreement is not about the empirical record itself but about the interpretation of the record and about the stability of estimated forecasting models. For example, Timmermann and Paye (2003) report parameter instability in a sequence of models, estimated for different periods, for which out of sample predictions are unstable and inaccurate. Here we focus only on the empirical record.
We examine the following: (i) Variance Ratio statistic; (ii) autocorrelation of returns and of price/dividend ratios; (iii) regressions of cumulative returns, and (iv) the predictive power of the dividend yield. We first introduce notation. Let be the log of gross one year stock return, be the cumulative log-return of length k from t-k+1 to t, and
be the cumulative log-return over a k-year horizon from t+1 to t+k.
5.1a Variance Ratio Test
Define the variance-ratio statistic by . It converges to one if returns VR(k)
are uncorrelated. However, if returns are negatively autocorrelated at some lags, the ratio is less than one. Our results show that there exists a significant higher order autocorrelation in stock returns hence there is a long run predictability which is consistent with U.S. statistics on stock returns, as reported in Poterba and Summers (1988) . In Figure 3 we present a plot of the variance ratios computed from our model. For k >1 the ratio is less than 1 and declines with k.
FIGURE 3 PLACE HERE
In Table 6 we report computed values of the ratios for k = 1, 2, ..., 10 and compare them with ratios computed for U.S. stocks by Poterba and Summers ((1988) , Table 2 , line 3) for k = 1, 2,...,8. Our model's prediction is very close to the U.S. empirical record 
5.1b The Autocorrelation of Log-Returns and Price-Dividend ratios
In Tables 7 we report the autocorrelation function of log annual returns. Our model predicts negatively autocorrelated returns at all lags. This implies a long horizon mean reversion of the kind documented extensively by Poterba and Summers (1988) , Fama and French (1998a) and Campbell and Shiller (1988) . Thus, apart from the very short returns which exhibit positive autocorrelation, the model reproduces reasonably well the empirical record.
In Table 8 we report the autocorrelation function of the price-dividend ratio. Table shows the model generates a highly autocorrelated price/dividend ratio which matches reasonably well the behavior observed in the U.S. stock market data. The empirical record in Tables 7 and 8 is for NYSE data covering the period 1926-1995 as reported in Barberis et al. (2001) . 
5.1c Mean Reversion of Log-Returns
Mean reversion of stock returns was studied under several models. We compare our results with the results of Fama and French (1988a) . Thus, consider the regression model (17) .
The evidence suggests that stock prices have a random-walk and a stationary component (see Fama and French (1988a) Figure 4 and Table 9 report such a pattern. 
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5.1d Dividend Yield as a Predictor of Future Stock Returns
The papers cited above show that the price/dividend ratio is the best explanatory variable of long returns. To test this fact in our model we consider the following regression model
The empirical evidence reported in Fama and French (1988b) shows that the power of the dividend yields to forecast stock returns, measured by regression coefficient of (18), increases R 2 with the return horizon. We find that our model captures the main features of the empirical evidence and we report it in Table 10 . To conclude the discussion of predictability, we observe that the empirical evidence reported by French (1998a, 1998b) , Campbell and Shiller (1988) , Poterba and Summers (1998) and others is consistent with asset price theories in which time-varying expected returns generate predictable, mean-reverting, components of prices (see Summers (1986) ). The important economic question, motivated but left unresolved by these papers, is what drives the predictability of returns implied by such mean-reverting components of prices? One component of the answer is the persistence of the dividend growth rate via the equilibrium map (5). Our theory offers a second and stronger persistent mechanism which is also seen in (5). It shows these results are primarily driven by the dynamics of market state of beliefs which exhibit correlation across agents and persistence over time. Agents experience bull and bear states of beliefs. This causes their perception of risk to change and expected returns to vary over time. Equilibrium asset prices are functions of the state of belief which exhibit memory and mean reversion. Hence both prices and returns exhibit these same properties.
GARCH Behavior of the Price-dividend Ratio and of the Risky Returns
The presence of stochastic volatility in asset prices and returns has been well documented (e.g. Bollerslev, Engle and Nelson (1994) , Brock and LeBaron (1996) ). Indeed, in a partial equilibrium context it is standard to model the price of an asset by a stochastic differential equation which assumes an exogenously driven stochastic volatility. But where does stochastic volatility come from? The dividend process certainly does not exhibit stochastic volatility hence it cannot be the source of it. One of the most important implication of our theory is that it explains why asset prices and returns exhibit stochastic volatility. We start by presenting in Figures 5 and   6 the results of simulated 500 observations: in Figure 5 we report equilibrium price/dividend ratios and in Figure 6 the associated risky rates of return. Casual inspection of Figures 5 and 6 reveals that volatility is time varying with such time variability in the variance of both prices and returns.
However, GARCH behavior is more subtle than volatility clustering as it requires volatility to be persistent, exhibiting serial correlation and this requires a formal test.
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To formally test the GARCH property of the price/dividend ratio and of the risky return we used the 20,000 equilibrium observations discussed in the previous section. Using these data we estimated the following econometric model of the dynamics of the price/dividend ratio
Since the price dividend ratio is postulated to be an AR(1) process, the process in (19) is GARCH(1,1). Similarly, for the risky rates of return we postulated the econometric model §
For a specification of (19) and (20) we have also tested ARCH(1) and GARCH(2,1) but have concluded that the proposed GARCH(1,1) as in (19)- (20) The virtue of the above argument is that it explains the presence of stochastic volatility as an endogenous consequence of equilibrium dynamics. Some "fundamental" shocks (such as an oil shock) surely cause market volatility, but it has been empirically established that market volatility cannot be explained consistently by any repeated "fundamental" exogenous shocks (compare with Timmermann and Pesaran (1995) ). Hence, our explanation of stochastic volatility is consistent with the empirical evidence and is compatible with our general paradigm which views market expectations as the primary cause of market volatility.
Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a unified paradigm proposing that market volatility is driven primarily by market expectations. This conclusion extends and supports our previous results (cited earlier) on the subject. We constructed a simple model and tested it on all aspects of market volatility and found the model to match well the empirical record. The structure of the model is applicable to any phenomenon associated with market volatility since our main results are qualitative rather than quantitative. These results are driven by the fact that, under the Rational Belief principle, we do not write down a formal belief formation model. For a general equilibrium formulation all we need is a quantitative measure of how forecasts of an agent deviate from the empirical forecast. This is accomplished via the main tool of this paper which is the individual and market states of belief. These are indexes identifying the distribution of conditional probability functions of the agents at each date. Using this tool we show that there are two simple forces through which beliefs drive volatility: (i) over confidence of an agent' forecasts described by amplification of the agent's probabilities which, in turn, generate densities with fat tails, and (ii) asymmetry in the frequency of bull or bear states. Although these principles can be satisfied by different belief formation models, the simplest way to think of them is as an expression of animal spirits.
The important role market states of belief play in our theory is reflected in the fact that agents hold diverse individual forecasts of future market states of belief when they write down their Euler equations. In a mathematical sense our model is then a fully developed general equilibrium structure within which Keynes' intuitive "Beauty Contest" aspect of asset pricing is formally well defined. However, on a deeper level heterogenous individual forecasts of future market states of belief is entirely equivalent to heterogenous forecasts of future asset prices and interest rates and heterogenous price forecasting is the essence of our theory. In a general equilibrium context the tool of a market state of belief is a formal method for allowing agents to be rational and use the same equilibrium map (5) yet make heterogenous price forecasts. This suggest that we could build models in which agents make heterogenous price forecasts but then it will be equivalent to a model in which they know the equilibrium map but make heterogenous forecasts of an object like the market state of beliefs.
Let . This function is aimed at representing how agents deviate from
the stationary forecast. Agents pick the frequency parameter a and the intensity parameter b.
Given that we can carry out computations only with standard normal variables we need to normalize the variable u:
where , and . b
The density function
The density function of , conditioning on is given by: Note that , which ensures that the rationality conditions be satisfied, i.e.: EN 1 (# u 
